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1 BACKGROUND
Ethiopia, situated in the north-eastern corner of
Africa known as the Horn, neighbours Djibouti,
Somalia, the Sudan, Kenya and Eritrea. It has a
total land area of 1.224 million sq km comprising a
central highland mass surrounded by lowlands. The
tenth largest country in Africa, Ethiopia, is endowed
with major water resource potential for irrigation
and hydroelectric generation. It can produce 60
billion kwh. of electricity from its water resources of
which only 1.2 billion kwh. are being exploited. It
also possesses vast geothermal energy potential.
840,700 sq km of agricultural land are coupled with
88,200 sq km of forest land. Ethiopia's 1992 popula-
tion is estimated at 53 million (the second highest in
SSA) with an annual growth rate of 3 per cent,
an infant mortality rate of 110 per 1,000, and life
expectancy at birth of 47 years. Primary school
enrolment of the school age population remains
below the average for low income African countries.
All its social indicators are broadly consistent with
its per capita income of $120, among the lowest
ten in the world.
The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE)
was set up in July 1991 following the collapse of the
dictatorial military regime that had evolved after the
1974 Revolution. A 'National Conference on Peace
and Democracy' held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in
July, 1991, adopted the 'Transitional Period Charter
of Ethiopia' which stipulates the right to form politi-
cal parties; an independent judiciary; rights of na-
tionalities to administer their own affairs within their
own territory. The TGE will hold power until na-
tional elections are called under a new constitution.
The TGE has begun the process of establishing a
democratic and decentralized political system. Local
and regional elections took place in June 1992.
2 ETHIOPIA'S ECONOMY PRIOR TO THE 1991-
93 ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMME (ERP)
GDP growth has been persistently declining since
1988 and has rarely exceeded population growth
over the past 40 years.
Ethiopia has a predominantly agricultural based
economy, 40 per cent of GDP, 85 per cent of exports,
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85 per cent of total employment. About 15 per cent of
Ethiopia's agricultural land is under cultivation in a
sector characterized by peasant farming. Field crops
account for about 40 per cent of the gross value of
agricultural production, livestock another 40 per
cent, export and industrial crops 20 per cent. The
industrial sector contributes some 12 per cent of
GDP and 15 per cent of export earnings. It produces
mainly agro-processed goods, textiles and gar-
ments, and leather products. It is dominated by
public enterprises, which contribute more than
70 per cent of manufacturing value added; the rest
is accounted for by small private enterprises. The
rest of the national output is attributable to the
service sector whose contribution has been driven
by high government expenditure.
Coffee accounted for 60 per cent of export value in
1990. Other exports include leather and leather
products, oilseeds, pulses, live animals, sugar,
fruits and vegetables, and spices. The Ethiopian
economy is characterized by low productivity,
structural rigidities, and a large public sector. Infra-
structure is poorly developed and inefficient with
one of the lowest road densities in Africa. Nearly
three-fourths of Ethiopia's farms are not easily
accessed from all weather roads.
Performance of the Ethiopian economy has been
very poor during the 1974 to 1991 period. By 1989/
90 overall GDP growth was minus 0.9 per cent below
zero, and in 1990/91 it declined, by a further 0.3 per
cent. Major contributors to the declining perform-
ance of the Ethiopian economy included the restric-
tive economic policies after the Revolution of 1974,
severe weather fluctuations, natural calamities and
drought; and the diversion of resources from pro-
ductive use to finance the military and the civil war,
which by 1990 absorbed more than 50 per cent of
the recurrent budget; external shocks resulting
from unfavourable terms of trade, and the external
debt burden.
Ethiopia's people faced a chronic food deficit (due
to low food production) which was only made good
through external food aid. Agriculture apart from
being unable to supply agricultural raw materials
required by the manufacturing sector, failed to
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generate sufficient foreign exchange earnings for
the procurement of operating inputs and spare
parts, thereby affecting the productive capacity of
all sectors.
3 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Declining export earnings and rising merchandise
imports, despite positive non-factor service receipts,
resulted in Ethiopia's current account deficit rising
during the 1980s. Export earnings declined from
Birr 942 million in 1985/86 (about $450 million) to
Birr 756 million in 1989/90 and further to Birr 389
million in 1991/92; while imports increased from
Birr 2,018 million in 1984/85 to Birr 2,274 million in
1989/88. Consequently, the visible trade deficit
jumped from Birr 1,274 million to Birr 1,486 million
in 1987/88 and further to Birr 1,777 million in
1991 /92. The decline in the price of coffee, which
accounts for 60 per cent of the total export value
parallel to a fall in volume of coffee export was the
major cause. Other export items also experienced a
fall in the volume of their export. All exportables
have been subjected to illicit trade across borders
with smuggled exports are estimated to have
amounted to 30 per cent of the official.
For the same period the country witnessed a
tremendous increase in imports to finance the
import of food, raw materials, fuel and capital
goods. The trade deficit was 10 per cent of GDP in
1988/89 and 9.3 per cent in 1989/90. The widening
resource gap led to increasing dependence on exter-
nal financing. The current account deficit has been
financed essentially through public transfers includ-
ing grants and external borrowing from multilateral
and bilateral sources. There was a substantial inflow
of grants for famine relief after the 1985 drought.
Developmental grants and credits from some social-
ist countries were obtained in the 1980s. Foreign
exchange reserves, boosted by the large receipts of
relief assistance after the 1985 drought, were mas-
sively depleted in the ensuing years to 3 weeks
merchandise imports at the end of 1989. In 1990/91
reserves went negative.
State external borrowing to finance the current
account deficit led to indebtedness (excluding
military aid), rising 1,488 million Birr in 1980,
increasing to 3,336 million Birr in 1984/85 and 7,252
million Birr in 1989/90. The ratio of foreign debt to
GDP jumped from 18 per cent in 1980 to 34 per cent
in 1984/85, and 58 per cent in 1989/90.
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Debt servicing, as a share of exports earning rose
sharply from about 8 per cent in 1980 to 25 per cent
in 1984/85, and a phenomenal 61 per cent in 1989/90.
It further rose, on a commitment basis, to 81 per cent
in 1991/92. Unable to meet its loan obligations,
Ethiopia went into arrears for the first time in 1989/
90 to the tune of 358 million Birr. In 1990/91, it built
up an additional 456 million Birr arrears. As of
October 1992, the total payment arrears amounted to
about 1,000 million Birr, significantly greater than
one year's exports earnings. Barring substantial
cancellation, debt repayment has rendered the
balance of payments position unsustainable.
4 GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND
EXPENDITURE, MONEY SUPPLY, BANKING
During the 17 years ending 1990/91, the overall
budget deficit (including grants) showed substan-
tial fluctuations and averaged 7 per cent of GDP.
Revenue rose to about 13 per cent of GDP in 1974/75
because of tax and discretionary revenue measures
such as the war levy and mandatory contributions
from public enterprise surpluses, reaching a peak of
over 31 per cent in 1988/89. Total expenditure rose
from about 17 per cent of GDP in 1974/75 to almost
47 per cent in 1988/89 The rise in total expenditure
during the period was largely due to climbing mili-
tary expenditures and relatively high capital
outlays. After reaching more than 16 per cent in
1989/90, the budget deficit fell to 13 per cent of
GDP in 1990/91 with revenue and expenditure 25
per cent and 38 per cent respectively. A sharp drop
in military outlays in May 1991 was largely offset
by a fall in revenue, which stemmed from the
slow-down in economic activity and from disrup-
tion of revenue collection in the final months of
the civil war. The overall budgetary deficit has
been covered by both domestic bank and pension
fund borrowing and external loans and grants.
Because the domestic bank financing was not
backed by production, it became inflationary.
Bank financing of the budget deficit tremendously
increased the volume of money supply. Broad
money expansion average about 12 per cent annually
during the period of 1973/74 - 1990/91, while the
growth of credit to the non-governmental sector
sharply declined. In 1990/91 broad money recorded
the highest increase in recent years - 18 per cent -
fuelled by bank financing of the fiscal deficit. Despite
the growing inflationary pressure, the level and
structure of nominal interest rates have remained
unchanged since 1986 when lending rates were
revised downward and were differentiated to favour
economic activity in the socialized sector (co-opera-
fives and public enterprises). Time and deposit rates
were also revised to encourage long-term deposits by
small depositors. Interest rates which had been
positive in real terms throughout the 1980s, became
generally negative by 1989/90.
The impact of budget deficit financing was a general
price rise for basic commodities and services. The
Addis Ababa Retail Price Index showed a rise in
inflation rate of 5 per cent in 1989/90 to 20 per cent
in 1990/91, with no growth in nominal household
income for the same period. The inflation gave rise
to a stagflationary economic crises with rapidly fall-
ing living standards and rampant unemployment.
The Ethiopian Birr remained pegged to the US dollar
at the rate of Birr 2.07 per US dollar between 1973
and 1992. Reflecting the movements in the dollar, as
well as the relative prices between Ethiopia and its
trading partners, the real effective exchange rate of
the Birr appreciated substantially from 1973, the
scope of the illegal parallel markets widened
with Birr US dollar in excess of 6 to 1. Consumer
prices of a large proportion of imported goods
reflected the parallel rate.
5 INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS
The Gross Fixed Capital Investment ratio declined
from 16 per cent of GDP in 1986/87 to 9 per cent in
1991 /92. The declining investment ratio coupled
with population increase and unemployment
brought about the deepening of the economic crises.
Savings declined throughout the 1980s to reach
0.2 per cent of the GDP in 1990/91 go negative in
1991/992 year when GDP could not cover total
domestic consumption. As a result, gross fixed in-
vestment was totally financed by external sources.
The resource gap rose to 12.3 per cent of GDP
in 1991/92 even though barely over 10 per cent
gross and possibly negative at net level.
6 ETHIOPIA'S NEW ECONOMIC POLICY
DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
As a result of the misguided policies of the previous
dictatorial military regime and of the civil war, the
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) inher-
ited a shattered economy. Structural problems,
natural and man-made calamities, and civil strife
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have had a stifling impact on the economic
growth. Recurrent droughts have had a devastating
effect on the natural and human resources of the
countryside. Much of industrial production came to
a standstill; essential infrastructure had been
destroyed by war damage and neglect, with
exports falling to their lowest level in 20 years. an
accompanying social crises involved millions of
displaced persons, refugees, demobilized soldiers,
homeless and unemployed people.
To reverse this declining trend, TGE drew up a
new economic policy in 1991 to reorient and revital-
ize the country's economy. The overall objective
was first to encourage growth by replacing the
previous centrally planned economy with a market
based economy, and second to reduce poverty
and create an enabling environment for economic
development.
Changing the role of the state in the economy
was seen as crucial, because it is evident that in
the past state control over the entire economy was
a major cause of economic decline. The new role
is to include:
a designing economic policies mapping out
economic development strategies and promul-
gating laws and regulations that foster economic
development;
b participating directly or through joint venture
arrangements in activities that are considered essen-
tial and in which the private sector is not willing
to participate;
c designing implementing and supervising the
expansion of infrastructure, research and develop-
ment, manpower training as a basis for economic
expansion;
d creating enabling conditions to encourage private
production and investment expansion and to pro-
vide opportunities for popular participation at house-
hold, community and co-operative level;
e protecting consumers and producers against price
fluctuations and taking regulatory measures to
prevent shortages of basic commodities.
One major hindrance to economic development in
the past was the restrictive policies imposed on the
activities of the private sector. Without changes in
the policy, efforts to realize economic recovery
were seen to be futile. To encourage private capital
participation, the state is to:
a create enabling conditions for the participation
of both domestic and foreign private capital in
economic activities without any capital limitation;
b remove all existing bureaucratic procedures and
red-tape and introduce and operate new laws and
regulations to enhance domestic and foreign private
capital participation;
c provide incentives and encouragements to pro-
mote domestic capital participation, encourage a
wider participation of private foreign capital. The
state will work out a comprehensive package of
incentives for domestic and foreign private capital
participation;
d Provide special encouragement free from state
interference to communities participating in eco-
nomic development.
In order to achieve immediate and durable results
in economic reconstruction and for sustainable
growth, it is seen as essential to enlist popular
participation. Hence, appropriate recognition needs
to be accorded to the decisive role the public can
play in national economic reconstruction and devel-
opment. The policy of centralization adopted by the
previous government prevented the participation of
local government organs and the public in formulat-
ing and implementing economic policies. Without
voluntary popular participation and initiative, it is
perceived to be utterly impossible to solve the present
economic impasse.
Local administrative organs are to be given the
opportunity to play a greater role in the implementa-
tion of the economic policy as well as in relief
and rehabilitation programmes, consistent with the
overall strategy of decentralization of powers to
regional and local government. It should be noted
that the participation of the public will not, as in
the past, be on the basis of compulsion, contrary to
their interest or against their beliefs.
Since national and regional administrative organs
are the machineries for popular participation
through democratic elections, they will have the
right over the ownership and management of
resources. The state will issue detailed policies
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defining relationships between national and
regional administrative organs and the Central Tran-
sitional Government regarding the ownership of
resources and on regional economic responsibilities.
In order to achieve the objectives of the Transitional
Economic Policy, the Government will have to
secure substantial external resources and channel
them in a co-ordinated effective manner to economic
reconstruction. Securing external support will of
necessity be a major foreign policy objective.
Past macroeconomic policies were designed to
serve the defunct regime and are inconsistent with
the new economic policy. Therefore, they have to be
revised, and in some cases new policies have to be
issued, in order to ensure consistency with the new
economic policy.
a Policies, laws and regulations regarding money
supply, credit and interest, taxes and investment
consistent with the new economic policy, to
facilitate a market economy, encourage private
sector participation, and facilitate and encourage
existing economic establishments to operate
efficiently;
b A new labour law to promote productivity and
efficiency while at the same time protecting the rights
of workers;
c A population policy to ensure a balance between
rates of population and economic growth;
d A technology policy to ensure the technological
and productivity development of all sectors as a
basis for sustained growth.
In tandem with the general provisions of the new
economic policy, TGE issued also specific sectoral
policies for the transitional period. These include:
agriculture, industry, trade, finance, transport and
communications, mining and energy, urban devel-
opment and construction and social.
TGE identified priority areas which merited
immediate government attention as a result of the
grave prevailing economic and social conditions:
a rehabilitate regions affected by drought and war;
b restore infrastructure destroyed by war and/or
lack of maintenance and upkeep;
c give special attention to neglected areas;
d complete on-going projects and
e undertake limited activities in new infrastructure
development.
7 PERFORMANCE DURING THE ECONOMIC
REFORM PROGRAMME
Major steps taken by TGE in 1992 represent a sub-
stantial portion of the strategic shift envisaged in
1991. The Ethiopian Birr was devalued on 1 October
1992, the exchange rate in terms of US dollars becom-
ing 5 to 1 more than doubling the previous rate. To
rationalize and increase the availability of foreign
exchange a flexible exchange rate policy has been
pursued by the National Bank of Ethiopia since April
1993 by periodic auctioning of foreign exchange to
importers. Early indications are that export trade
through the official channels has increased signifi-
cantly. To offset the negative effect of devaluation on
the cost of living, the TGE made special salary incre-
ments in October 1992 for civil servants, including
employees of state-run enterprises, and also adjusted
income tax deductions.
Reform measures already taken to liberalize the trade
include deregulation of the prices of agricultural
products and manufactured goods. Automatic grant-
ing of trade licences has been instituted and export
taxes eliminated. To encourage their production for
export minimum guaranteed prices are set for coffee,
sesame seed, and haricot beans.
The TGE promulgated a new investment code in 1992
to create an enabling policy environment encourag-
ing private capital participation. In August 1992 a
new law to enhance the efficiency, productivity,
competitiveness and profitability of public enter-
prise was issued. Its aim is to enable the enterprises
to enjoy management autonomy and to restructure
themselves along productive and cost efficient lines.
In September1992, the TGE issued a new labour code
which gives management flexibility to address pro-
ductivity and profitability decisions, while also seek-
ing to protect legitimate rights of workers against
arbitrary or oppressive actions.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS
The structural rigidities of the Ethiopian economy,
constitute the most fundamental cause of
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macroeconomic imbalances. The most important
manifestations of these are: the predominance of
subsistence agriculture, a narrow manufacturing
production base with backward technology, neglect
of the informal sector, drought and environmental
degradation, disintegration of markets and fragmen-
tation of the economy, weak institutional capabilities
and excessive dependence on external factor inputs.
The economy was also constrained by unfavourable
external factors. The preconditions for balance of
payments support and debt relief from external
sources were tight. Internally, the economy suffered
from lack of relevant institutions, wrong policies,
poor accountability, and mismanagement.
As a result of structural problems and poor manage-
ment of the economy the following constraints can be
identified:
poor agricultural productivity and food insecu-
rity,
low capacity utilization and declining productiv-
ity in the manufacturing industry,
low savings and investment ratios,
inability to earn or save foreign exchange,
population growth in excess of that of GDP,
poor economic and social infrastructure,
long and painful recovery of the economy from
war and weather disasters,
unfavourable external factors.
To correct macroeconomic imbalances and to reduce
constraint the following areas require strategic insti-
tutions;
a Food self-sufficiency: With policy designed to
achieve food self-sufficiency including a balance
between food production and the production of
primary agricultural exports and/or expanding the
production base through the use of appropriate tech-
nology for the transformation of agriculture to
increase food supply as well as agricultural
products for export. A credit policy favouring
food production and the manufacture of essential
goods is needed to achieve the second objective. In
parallel a population policy is needed to reduce
the pressure of domestic demand for food.
b Management of debt and debt-servicing re-
quires a strong debt-management system for the
scarce foreign exchange inflows to be utilized
judiciously. Debt management would involve a
continuous assessment of debt repayment capacity.
Debt acceptance should be rational, by allocating
future loans to productive projects that result
in quick and high returns to maintain future borrow-
ing capacity
c The satisfaction of basic needs, other than food,
should be addressed systematically. To enhance the
production of basic goods and services requires the
allocation of an increasing share of foreign exchange
for imports of inputs for agriculture and manufac-
turing sectors to result in the expansion of
agricultural and industrial employment to raise
entitlements as well as to enhance physical supply
for encouragement of domestic output import
restriction and allocation of foreign exchange
should be in ways which strengthen inter-linkages
between agriculture and industry.
d Effective use of domestic savings requires
systematic reduction of speculative activities and the
shifting of resources to productive engagements.
Selective interest rates that encourage productive
activities, as well as reducing inflation to allow
overall interest rate reduction, may be instrumental
for resource mobilization and allocation to produc-
tion as well as commerce. The mobilization of rural
savings requires creating and strengthening rural
financial institutions.
e The rehabilitation and utilization of currently
idle productive and infrastructural capacity is a
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pre-condition for faster economic growth. Encour-
agement of greater productive capacity is needed in
parallel. A medium term loan fund is intended to
provide entrepreneurs with enhanced term capital
access at reasonable interest rates.
f Balance of payment management needs to in-
clude strategies to encourage capital inflows,
especially through remittances by nationals working
abroad. Discouraging capital flight and encouraging
remittances turn on adoption of measures and
procedures that enhance the promotion, prospects
and development of small-scale industries. Improve-
ment in the balance of payments also requires
the promotion of exports through appropriate fiscal
and monetary policies.
g Measures that reduce government expenditure
and increase its revenue are needed to reduce
budgetary deficits. By broadening tax base and
improving efficiency of tax collection machinery
more revenue can be raised. Broadening the tax
base requires the provision of a package of
incentives for investors and entrepreneurs to
reduce present high levels of evasion. On the
expenditure side, government should reduce
expenses of non-productive activities - particularly
the armed forces - to release resources for both
social (human) and fixed capital (infrastructural)
investmènt.
